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Abstract
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are often claimed to be less profitable and less efficient compared to private
corporations. According to Grout and Stevens (2003), SOEs were associated with different types of market
failure and were mostly used to attain non-economic goals such as unemployment level reduction, control
over natural resources, and political stability. Shirley and Walsh (2000), who surveyed 52 studies on the
difference in performance between SOEs and private corporations, discovered that there were only five
studies indicating that SOEs outperformed private corporations. However, these studies only monitored the
firms in the monopolistic utility sectors. Similar situations occurred in most of the previous studies that
researched correlation between performance and firm ownership. Many of them either focused heavily on
industries with monopoly/oligopoly characteristics or industries with output that could not be priced by
competitive forces. As a result, it was difficult to distinguish the effects of market regulations and conditions
on the types of firm ownership. Since there is a correlation between competition and performance, controlling
for the market structure is crucial to the proper investigation of performance across different types of
ownership (Goldeng, Grunfeld, & Benito, 2008). Since my research is focusing on the difference in
performance between SOEs and private corporations within a competitive environment, it contributes to the
very few studies that controlled for the market structure. My main research question is whether private
corporations perform better compared to SOEs in terms of profitability and efficiency in the strategic sectors
in a competitive environment. My hypothesis is that due to the soft-budget constraint behavior and policy
burdens imposed by the state, SOEs are less efficient and have lower profitability compared to private
corporations.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol25/iss1/8
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Performance in Strategic Sectors: A Comparison of Profitability 
and Efficiency of State-Owned Enterprises and Private 
Corporations 
 
  Brigitta Jakob 
 
I. Introduction 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are often claimed to be less profitable and less efficient 
compared to private corporations. According to Grout and Stevens (2003), SOEs were associated 
with different types of market failure and were mostly used to attain non-economic goals such as 
unemployment level reduction, control over natural resources, and political stability. Shirley and 
Walsh (2000), who surveyed 52 studies on the difference in performance between SOEs and 
private corporations, discovered that there were only five studies indicating that SOEs 
outperformed private corporations. However, these studies only monitored the firms in the 
monopolistic utility sectors. Similar situations occurred in most of the previous studies that 
researched correlation between performance and firm ownership. Many of them either focused 
heavily on industries with monopoly/oligopoly characteristics or industries with output that could 
not be priced by competitive forces. As a result, it was difficult to distinguish the effects of market 
regulations and conditions on the types of firm ownership. Since there is a correlation between 
competition and performance, controlling for the market structure is crucial to the proper 
investigation of performance across different types of ownership (Goldeng, Grunfeld, & Benito, 
2008).  
Since my research is focusing on the difference in performance between SOEs and private 
corporations within a competitive environment, it contributes to the very few studies that 
controlled for the market structure. My main research question is whether private corporations 
perform better compared to SOEs in terms of profitability and efficiency in the strategic sectors in 
a competitive environment. My hypothesis is that due to the soft-budget constraint behavior and 
policy burdens imposed by the state, SOEs are less efficient and have lower profitability compared 
to private corporations.  
 
II. Theoretical Framework and Empirical Studies 
II.A Theoretical Framework 
II.A.1 Difference between SOEs and Private Corporations 
SOEs are typically sizeable firms in a dominant sector in an economy. In most of the 
developing countries, state ownership is geared towards strategic sectors — either sectors that are 
crucial for economic development or that control natural resources of a country (Shleifer, 1998). 
There are a number of key differences between state and private ownerships in terms of objectives, 
financing, liquidation, management, and compensation. The main objective of private ownership 
is to maximize profits for the capitalists who own the corporation. Meanwhile, the ultimate goal 
for SOEs is to balance the interests of the stakeholders, including protecting jobs and preventing 
social unrests. Lastly, government can act as a backup that provides subsidies to the SOEs when 
their sources of revenue fall short of covering costs (Grout and Stevens, 2003).  
When it comes to the liquidation of the firm, private ownership will have to declare 
bankruptcy or to be acquired when it becomes insolvent. The exit of SOEs will have to be 
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determined by the government — firms that are perceived as ‘too big to fail’ will be bailed out by 
taxpayers’ money (Peng, Bruton, Stan, and Huang, 2016). Unlike management of private 
corporations who usually have complete autonomy in any key decisions, management of SOEs 
only has autonomy in aligning operational strategies, types of output, and internal policies. 
Government plays a major part in other significant activities such as choosing the domain of 
activities, technology investments, and establishing subsidiaries (Aharoni, 1981). Lastly, 
managers’ compensation under private ownership is closely tied to the enterprise performance. 
That is not the case for managers in state ownership as their compensation is determined politically 
(Peng, Bruton, Stan, and Huang, 2016). Compared to private corporations, SOEs have a number 
of advantages including state subsidies, exclusive government contracts, low-interest loans, tax-
breaks, and low-priced raw materials (Li, Lin, and Selover, 2014). However, there are also a 
number of disadvantages associated with state ownership. 
 
Soft-Budget Constraint 
According to soft-budget constraint hypothesis, the state extends various forms of support 
to SOEs. As a result, this situation distorts the incentive structure because an SOE does not have 
to desperately rely upon generating profit to guarantee its long-term existence or have to worry 
about competition. Because a competitive environment incentivizes a management to constantly 
improve their performance and to innovate, an SOE is expected to deliver inferior performance 
compared to a private corporation (Goldeng, Grunfeld, and Benito, 2008). The soft cushion also 
allows the SOEs to be more risk taking in terms of investing their capital and to have less incentive 
to spend effectively. Because the returns from an SOE are allocated into a public budget that no 
one is specifically assigned to benefit from it as a principal, incentives to closely monitor the 
actions and performance of managers are significantly reduced (Stiglitz, 1988).   
If managers of private corporations do not allocate their resources efficiently, the market 
will conduct a course of actions including replacing the managers, retracting the capital, taking 
over the company, or shutting down the company. However, the decision on what to do with SOEs 
in similar situation does not fall on the market, but it is decided by the government (Stiglitz, 1988). 
That is why the soft-budget constraint situation also causes the difference in skill-sets between the 
managers of SOEs and private corporations. While the latter needs to be highly capable of 
generating profit for the company, the former needs to be able to deal with the 
government/politicians (Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova, 1996). Eventually, the soft-
budget constraint results in a number of moral hazard problems. In many cases, it impacts both the 
psychology and behavior of the SOE employees to be less aggressive in controlling for costs, to 
be less innovative, and to be less efficient as they don’t have to try as hard as the employees of 
private corporations to ensure the survival of the firm (Li, Lin, and Selover, 2014).  
 
Lack of Autonomy due to Policy Burdens 
 Another reason for less-than-optimal performance by the SOEs is because they are entitled 
to less autonomy as they have to help government achieve its special goals. According to Groves, 
Hong, McMillan, and Naughton (1994), when a firm had more autonomy in labor decisions, profit 
attainment, and output decisions, it would experience higher efficiency compared to firms that had 
less autonomy in making these crucial decisions. As SOEs are owned by the government, they 
might have to compromise their profit-maximizing goal in order to prioritize on other government 
goals. This is because through SOEs, government plays a conflicting role as a regulator and 
shareholder. As a regulator, government has a social contract with the public, hence has to serve 
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their best interests in terms of maintaining the social order. As a shareholder however, government 
has to increase the value of its investment (Chen, 2016). Hence, they are faced with multiple and 
conflicting objectives. Moreover, given that these other non-financial objectives make it difficult 
to measure the performance of an SOE, the incentives of SOE management is not as closely knit 
to the performance of the company as to those of private corporations (Putnins, 2015).  
For instance, the Chinese government is notorious for often requiring the SOEs to maintain 
a surplus of employees in order to keep a low unemployment level, to provide satisfying level of 
benefits to the employees, and to sell the products at a lower price to the government (Lin and Li, 
2008). Even though these policies are favorable to the Chinese government, they perpetuate 
inefficiency problems within the SOEs. According to research conducted by Lin and Li (2008) on 
Chinese SOEs between 1995-2001, the policy burden placed on SOEs triggered soft-budget 
constraint problems. As long as the SOEs helped the government carry out its goals (policy 
burdens), there would be a growing perception that the government would help the SOEs when 
things did not go well (soft-budget constraint).  
 Moreover, when different appointed public officials take office, they often have divergent 
views on which public interests they should prioritize. When these differences are not reconciled, 
it will be extremely hard for the employees to figure out the ultimate goals they are supposed to 
achieve.  When the SOE itself is struggling with internally conflicting interests and instructions, 
the managers often turn to cooperative strategies in order to secure government support (Aharoni, 
1981).  
  
II.A.2 Correlation between Ownership and Efficiency 
According to neoclassical economic theory, efficiency is mostly affected by market and 
incentive structure rather than the type of ownership. Regardless whether a firm is state-owned or 
privately owned, efficiency can be achieved as long as the firm operates in a competitive market, 
gives full autonomy to the management to make crucial decisions based on market signals, and 
provides performance-based compensation (Nellis, 1994). In reality, the above conditions are 
rarely met within SOEs, and when the criteria are fulfilled, they are not sustainable in the long run. 
SOEs’ responsibility to achieve both commercial and social objectives creates inefficient use of 
resources. Even though during times of crisis government often shifts its focus to a more profitable 
goal and grants full-autonomy to management, the change in behavior does not last when the crisis 
ends (Heracleous, 2001). The neoclassical theory is supported by a study conducted by Wortzel 
and Wortzel (1989) on privatization of SOEs. They concluded that SOEs were more inefficient 
compared to private corporations not because of the type of ownership, but mostly due to the lack 
of clear objectives and goals focusing on efficiency, and additionally lack of organization-level 
control systems to attain these goals.  
Moreover, due to the perception that government is available to back them up, the 
employees of SOEs may have the tendency to develop rent-seeking behavior in order to seek for 
themselves more resources from the government. In addition, as they feel that their job security is 
guaranteed, the employees will not have the pressure to work very hard. As a result, the 
combination of rent-seeking behavior and reduced productivity will create higher burden of cost 
for the SOEs, which increases potential for inefficiency (Li, Lin, and Selover, 2014). According 
to Putnins (2015), the inefficiency SOEs usually encounter will either result in less output 
produced given an amount of resources or more resources used to produce the same amount of 
output. Individuals will be impacted through a number of channels including higher prices of the 
goods relative to the case of higher efficiency, higher taxes to compensate for lower  dividends, 
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higher SOE subsidies compared to if SOEs were more efficient, and combinations of all of the 
channels. Hence, the above theory suggests the hypothesis that due to the soft-budget constraint 
behavior and policy burdens imposed by the state, SOEs have lower profitability and are more 
inefficient compared to private corporations. 
 
II.B Empirical Studies on SOE Performance 
 A number of studies have shown mixed results regarding the difference in performance 
between SOEs and private corporations. Boardman and Vining (1989) conducted a study on the 
correlation between ownership and performance in competitive environment across the 500 largest 
companies outside of the United States, as listed by the Fortune magazine in 1983. They 
discovered that SOEs and mixed enterprises (MEs) had inferior performance to that of private 
corporations in terms of both profitability and efficiency. For profitability, SOEs had the return on 
equity (ROE) that was 12 percent less than what PCs had, and generated US$66 million less in net 
income compared to private corporations. For efficiency measurement, SOEs produced 4.4 percent 
less sales per employee compared to private corporations. Li, Lin, and Selover (2014) studied a 
panel dataset of more than 200,000 Chinese manufacturing firms during 2000-2005 to determine 
whether SOEs and private corporations performed differently in terms of their return on assets 
(ROA), ROE, return on sales (ROS), labor productivity, and sales growth. They discovered that 
the industrial SOEs performed worse than private corporations in terms of all of the categories 
investigated. This was mainly triggered by the fact that SOEs were subject to policy burdens. 
Moreover, the behavior of SOEs also demonstrated signs of soft-budget constraint, including 
higher investment rates compared to private corporations, higher operating costs, and higher debt 
levels.  
 A similar result was achieved by Goldeng, Grunfeld, and Benito (2008), who studied 
differences in performance between state and private ownership with the emphasis on the impacts 
of the market structure. Using ROA and cost/sales revenue to measure the performance of all 
registered companies in Norway in the 1990s, they found that private corporations performed 
significantly better than SOEs. Putnins (2015) developed a five-step framework that can help 
government improve and create SOEs. His framework implied that the creation of SOEs should 
only be limited to instances where there were market failures and that state intervention (in the 
forms of taxes, regulation, or subsidies) was not feasible to mitigate these failures. He further 
suggested that SOEs should be created if the cost of market failures exceeded the inefficiencies of 
SOEs and that there was low risk in government failure.  
 However, in an exploratory study, Heracleous (2001) discovered that superior performance 
was attainable under state ownership. Within the case of Singapore Telecom (Singtel), the state 
did not burden the SOE with demands that could compromise its profitability and efficiency. In 
most cases, this was not true for SOEs which were constantly imposed with objectives that 
jeopardized the two aspects, such as keeping incompetent employees for the sake of better 
employment figures. The state demanded the management of Singtel to prioritize on profitability, 
efficiency, and best quality of service. Singtel‘s main objective was commercially oriented without 
having to worry about the policy burdens. Moreover, Ang and Ding (2006) compared the 
performance of 15 government-linked companies and 144 private corporations in Singapore from 
1990-2000 and discovered that government-linked companies not only performed better in terms 
of ROE and ROA, but also in terms of governance practices and plan implementation.  
A number of other studies found that there was no correlation between ownership type and 
performance. In his study within the time period of 1994-1998 in Egypt, Omran (2004) discovered 
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that there was no significant difference in performance between state and private ownership. Peng, 
Bruton, Stan, and Huang (2016) investigated four theories — property rights theory, agency 
theory, transaction cost theory, and resource-based theory — and concluded that under any 
circumstances both private and state ownerships should deliver the same level of performance, as 
no one form of ownership is more superior compared to the other. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
studied 223 firms in the U.S. and discovered that there was no significant correlation between firm 
performance and ownership structure.  
  
III. Empirical Model  
Despite the mixed findings presented by the literature concerning the performance of 
SOEs, I hypothesize that when SOEs compete in the strategic industries that I study, the soft-
budget constraint behavior and state-imposed policy burdens will cause SOEs to have lower 
profitability and to be less efficient compared to private corporations. In order to test the 
hypothesis, I compiled the list of 510 firms which consists of 111 SOEs and 399 private 
corporations from the 2016 Forbes’ List of 2000 largest public companies. These companies are 
spread out within seven strategic sectors in 52 countries. Within the scope of this research, strategic 
sectors are defined as the sectors that play crucial roles on economic development of a nation, so 
government is more likely to partake in the sector through establishing an SOE. The strategic 
sectors that I gathered from the list include utilities, oil & gas, mining, transportation, ICT 
(information, communication, and technology), pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology. I utilized 
Yahoo Finance, Morningstar Direct, and annual reports to collect data on companies’ financials 
that are used as the control variables within this research.  
I conduct cross-sectional study using the OLS regression to test my hypothesis that private 
corporations perform better compared to SOEs in terms of profitability and efficiency. To test the 
profitability, I use return on asset (ROA), return on sales (ROS), and net income as dependent 
variables, and dummy variable for SOEs (hence, private corporations dummy is the benchmark) 
as the main independent variable. To measure the efficiency, sales per employee and sales per 
asset are used as the dependent variables. The difference in performance between SOEs and PCs 
can be affected by several confounding factors, such as types of industries, market share, sizes, 
market capitalization per employee, debt ratio, and home nations. Therefore, I control for these 
variables within each of the regression. Dummy variables for different types of industries and 
countries will be used to control for both factors. Hence, the models I use within this research: 
Profitability model: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴, 𝑅𝑂𝑆, 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
=  𝑐 +  𝑎1 (𝑆𝑂𝐸) +  𝑎2 (𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦)  +  𝑎3 (𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)  
+  𝑎4 (𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡)  +  𝑎5 (𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝/𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒)  +  𝑎6 (𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)  
+  𝑎7 (𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦)  +  𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 
 
Efficiency model: 
 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒, 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 
=  𝑐 +  𝑎1 (𝑆𝑂𝐸) +  𝑎2 (𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦)  +  𝑎3 (𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)  
+  𝑎4 (𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡)  +  𝑎5 (𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝/𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒)  +  𝑎6 (𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)  
+  𝑎7 (𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦)  +  𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 
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As listed in Table 1, SOE is expected to generate negative sign when it comes to both 
profitability and efficiency, because of the soft budget constraint and policy burdens imposed by 
the state.  Market share is expected to be positively correlated with the dependent variables because 
when a company has a larger market share compared to its competitors, it will be able to take 
advantage of economies of scale, resulting in higher profitability and efficiency. Size should also 
generate a positive sign because the more assets a company has, the more profit-generating 
opportunities it can create. 
 Moreover, when the market capitalization/employee is higher, it shows that a company is 
valued more by the public. Hence, more investments are flowing in and more profits can be earned. 
Lastly, debt ratio is expected to be negatively correlated with the dependent variables. When a 
company is burdened by higher level of debt, the sales the company earns will more likely be 
allocated for paying off the debt instead of for research and development. Therefore, lower 
profitability and efficiency can be attained.   
 
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Expected Signs 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Definition 
Dependent Variables 
ROA  Ratio of net income and total assets 
ROS  Ratio of net income and total sales 
Net Income  Final profit or loss after all expenses have been deducted from 
sales    
Sales/Employee  Amount of sales that is generated by each employee 
Sales/Assets  Amount of sales generated per $1 of a company's asset 
Explanatory Variables 
SOE - Dummy variable that indicates that a company is an SOE 
Market Share + Ratio of a company's sales and total sector's sales from the 
companies within the Forbes' list    
Size + Log of assets 
Market cap/employee 
+ 
Total market value of a company's outstanding shares 
calculated per employee 
Debt Ratio - Ratio of liabilities and assets 
Industry  Strategic sectors that consist of utilities, oil & gas, mining, 
transportation, ICT, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology    
Country  52 countries in total who have both SOE and private 
corporations that are from strategic sectors    
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IV. Results 
IV.A. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Forbes’ World’s Largest Public Companies, Morningstar, Yahoo 
Finance, and annual reports. 
Variable Private (PC) SOE Total
ROA (%) 3.42 4.91 3.75
(14.21)               (5.25)        (12.82)      
ROS (%) 8.39 7.92 8.29
(55.04)               (15.48)      (49.20)      
Net Income (USD 
millions) 1,063.44 1,262.45 1,106.76
(3,533.57)          (3,104.04) (3,442.70) 
Sales/Employee (USD 
millions) 5.43 0.96 4.45
(50.10)               (2.25)        (44.36)      
Sales/Assets (%) 65.18 75.37 67.40
(60.11)               (68.55)      (62.12)      
Market Share (%) 5.33 2.77 4.77
(16.33)               (4.75)        (14.65)      
Size 4.33 4.32 4.33
(0.51)                 (0.52)        (0.51)        
Market 
Capitalization/Employee 
(USD millions)
13.18 1.44 10.62
(128.88)             (3.48)        (114.08)    
Debt Ratio (%) 61.35 55.75 60.13
(18.71)               (22.10)      (19.61)      
Mining 0.19 0.16 0.18
(0.39)                 (0.37)        (0.39)        
Oil & Gas 39 0.2 0.19
(0.39)                 (0.40)        (0.39)        
Utilities 0.19 0.38 0.23
(0.39)                 (0.49)        (0.42)        
Other Sectors 0.44 0.26 0.40
(0.50)                 (0.44)        (0.49)        
China 0.04 0.35 0.10
(0.18)                 (0.48)        (0.31)        
India 0.02 0.09 0.04
(0.14)                 (0.29)        (0.19)        
Russia 0.02 0.07 0.03
(0.14)                 (0.26)        (0.17)        
Saudi Arabia 0 0.05 0.01
0 (0.23)        (0.11)        
Other Countries 0.92 0.43 0.82
(0.26)                 (0.50)        (0.39)        
Dependent Variables
Explanatory Variables
Note: All numbers in parentheses are standard deviations
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The variable means and standard deviations are listed in Table 2. The average return on 
asset (ROA) for SOEs is 4.91 percent, which is higher compared to private corporations that only 
generate 3.42 percent. SOEs also earn higher average net income at USD 1.26 billion, while the 
average net income of private corporations only stands at USD 1.06 billion.  However, they 
generate 8.39 percent in return on sales (ROS) on average, which is 0.47 percentage point higher 
compared to SOEs. Each employee in a private corporation generates USD 5.43 million in sales 
on average, which is 5.7 times higher than what an employee from an SOE can produce. On the 
other hand, SOEs have higher average sales/assets ratio (75.37 percent) compared to private 
corporations (65.18 percent).   
While the average size between the two types of ownership is quite similar, market share 
and market capitalization/employee are significantly different. Private corporations have 5.33% 
market share on average within each of their respective sector, while SOEs only maintain 2.77% 
of market share. Moreover, each employee within a private corporation generates an average of 
USD 13.18 million in market capitalization, where SOEs need about nine employees to generate 
the same amount. Both private corporations and SOEs carry relatively high burden of debt with 
their debt ratios are 61.35% and 55.75% respectively. The strategic sectors that have the most 
number of SOEs are utilities (42), oil & gas (22), and mining (18), while the countries with the 
highest total of SOEs are China (38), India (10), Russia (8), and Saudi Arabia (6).  
 
IV.B. OLS Regression 
The results for profitability and efficiency regressions are exhibited in Tables 3 and 4. The 
coefficient for SOEs turns out to be statistically insignificant at 0.05 level for both the profitability 
and efficiency models.  This disproves my hypothesis and shows that type of ownership does not 
affect the profitability and efficiency of a company. This is consistent with three different studies 
I presented earlier in the paper that concluded that there was no correlation between ownership 
and performance. Omran (2004) conducted a time series study on the firms in Egypt within the 
period of 1994-1998 and discovered that there was no significant difference in performance 
between state and private ownership. Peng, Bruton, Stan, and Huang (2016) investigated four 
different theories and claimed that no one form of ownership should be superior compared to the 
others. Hence, both private and state ownerships should deliver the same level of performance 
under any circumstances. My result also aligns with research conducted by Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) on 223 firms in the U.S., which highlighted the insignificant correlation between 
ownership structure and firm performance. 
As it is discovered that SOEs should have similar performance as private corporations, this 
shows that government subsidies, low-interest loans, and tax-breaks do not necessarily give SOEs 
a significant advantage compared to private corporations. This is because the advantage of the 
subsidies can potentially be compromised by the soft-budget constraint behavior and the 
conflicting roles of government. Firstly, the government subsidies can lead to soft-budget 
constraint behavior where SOEs have less incentive to spend effectively. Secondly, through SOE, 
government plays conflicting roles as both a shareholder – to increase the value of the investment 
– and a regulator – to maintain social order such as through creating more jobs. This type of policy 
burden reduces an SOE’s autonomy to solely focus on maximizing profit. Therefore, SOEs deliver 
similar performance to private corporations’ despite the government subsidies because they might 
be compromised by the soft-budget constraint behavior and the conflicting roles of the 
government.  
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Table 3: Regression Results:     Table 4: Regression Results 
Profitability Models Efficiency Models  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Forbes’ World’s Largest Public Companies, 
Morningstar, Yahoo Finance, and annual reports. 
Return on 
Assets (ROA)
Return on 
Sales (ROS)
Net Income
SOE 0.007 -0.028 -44.51
(0.447)           (0.428)          (0.110)         
Market Share 0.029 0.067 2591.514***
(0.758)           (0.424)          (2.668)         
Size -0.017 -0.012 2447.441***
(1.546)           (0.265)          (8.484)         
Market 
Capitalization per 0.000136** 1.32 x 10^-5 -0.125
(2.852)           (0.067)          (0.103)         
Debt Ratio -0.152*** -0.084 -3467.11***
(5.083)           (0.671)          (4.513)         
Mining -0.013 0.071 -1314.617***
(0.849)           (1.120)          (3.349)         
Oil & Gas -0.077*** 0.107 -2374.462***
(5.028)           (1.693)          (6.079)         
Utilities -0.022 0.014            -1115.247***
(1.475)           (0.232)          (2.973)         
China -0.001 0.029 532.614
(0.039)           (0.350)          (1.035)         
India 0.028 0.071 632.479
(0.948)           (0.580)          (0.834)         
Russia 0.078*** 0.034 1882.695***
(2.475)           (0.259)          (2.325)         
Saudi Arabia 0.006 0.049 244.202
(0.119)           (0.227)          (0.185)         
Adjusted R^2 0.136 -0.013 0.214
Sample Size 510 510 510
Explanatory 
Variable
Dependent Variable
Values in parentheses are absolute t-statistics
**   indicates significance at the .05 level
*** indicates significane level at the .01 level
Sales/ 
Employee
Sales/ Asset
SOE -0.747 0.033
           (0.156)      (407.000)
Market Share -3.415 -0.114
           (0.297)          (0.581)
Size 0.714 0.00023
           (0.209)          (0.004)
Market 
Capitalization per 
Employee 0.224*** 5.54 x 10^-5
         (15.572)          (0.225)
Debt Ratio -13.745 -0.059
           (1.514)          (0.279)
Mining -5.248 -0.07
           (1.131)          (0.880)
Oil & Gas -3.091 -0.134
           (0.670)          (1.698)
Utilities -7.047            0.050 
           (1.596)          (0.660)
China -2.172 -0.025
           (0.357)          (0.238)
India -1.211 0.101
           (0.135)          (0.658)
Russia 2.174 0.309
           (0.227)          (1.885)
Saudi Arabia -0.809 0.698***
           (0.052)          (2.619)
Adjusted R^2 0.338 0.011
Sample Size 510 510
Explanatory 
Variable
Dependent Variable
Values in parentheses are absolute t-statistics
**   indicates significance at the .05 level
*** indicates significane level at the .01 level
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As exhibited in the three profitability models and two efficiency models within Table 3 and 4, 
market cap/employee has a positive and significant correlation with return on assets (ROA) and 
sales/employee. For every USD 1,000 increase in market cap/employee, the ROA increases by 
0.14% and sales/employee grows by USD 224,000. In addition, market share has a significant 
correlation with net income at 0.01 level. For every 1% growth in market share, net income will 
increase by USD 2.6 billion. On the other hand, ROA will decline by 0.15% and net income will 
decrease by USD 3.5 billion for every 1% increase in debt ratio. Companies that operate in mining, 
utilities, and oil & gas experience on average USD 1.6 billion lower net income compared to any 
other sectors. Especially for oil & gas, it also has 0.08% lower ROA compared to others. This 
sector performs worst because the oil prices have been declining within the past several years, 
hence driving down the profitability of the companies within the sector.  
 Companies in Russia tend to experience higher profitability – 0.08% higher ROA and USD 
1.9 billion more net income – compared to companies from other countries regardless of their 
ownership. Moreover, companies in Saudi Arabia perform better in terms of efficiency as they 
have 0.7% higher sales/assets ratio compared to others. These different profitability and efficiency 
levels in different countries can potentially be driven by the leniency of the regulations, pricing 
policy, and the consumer market within each country. Companies in a heavily regulated 
environment will have a stronger incentive to underreport their profitability to avoid higher tax or 
stricter regulation (Sirtaine, Pinglo, Guasch, and Foster, 2004).  
 
V. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This study measures the difference in performance in terms of profitability and efficiency 
between SOEs and private corporations in strategic sectors. The main hypothesis of this study is 
that due to soft-budget constraint and lack of autonomy caused by the policy burdens, SOEs have 
lower profitability and are less inefficient compared to private corporations. The performance 
measures that are used to assess the profitability are ROA, ROS, and net income, while the 
measures to assess the efficiency are sales/employee and sales/assets. Through investigating 399 
private corporations and 111 SOEs from 52 countries and seven strategic sectors, this study 
discovers that there is no significant correlation between ownership type and performance. Hence, 
SOEs and private corporations are expected to deliver the same performance under any 
circumstances. This further shows that the government subsidies received by the SOEs do not 
necessarily provide them with an edge compared to private corporations. The subsidies can 
potentially be compromised by the soft-budget constraint behavior and the conflicting roles of the 
government through SOEs. 
The policy implication of the result is that government should look into limiting subsidies 
allocated for SOEs to a level that does not trigger soft-budget constraint behavior. Moreover, 
government should consider giving more autonomy to the SOEs so that it can minimize its 
conflicting roles both as a shareholder and a regulator. These policy implications are consistent 
with the result, which implies that potential advantage of the government subsidies can be 
compromised by the soft-budget constraint aspects and lack of autonomy. However, the result of 
this study necessitates a more comprehensive assessment computed with a larger set of measures, 
because the measures used within this research only provide a partial view. Moreover, different 
countries have different regulations and public policies that might impact how companies report 
their sales and profitability.  
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